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Երեվան
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After long hesitation, and endless negotiations with Washington, the Turkish authorities have finally decided to join the international coalition to fight the Islamic State - or ISIS. Turkish war on ISIS includes not only artillery shelling and aerial bombardments of ISIS positions inside Syria, but also – more importantly – allowing the US and British warplanes to use the Inçirlik airbase in attacks against ISIS. This will give US war planners shorter time spans to hit ISIS leaders once identified, and intensify American air campaign against the jihadists.
What made Turkey change its policy? The pretext is the suicide bombing of leftist gathering in Suruç, in southern Turkey, killing 32 civilians. Yet, this was only the pretext of changing Turkish policy to use jihadist militants of ISIS or other formation as its main policy instrument inside Syria. ISIS failed to become an effective instrument against the emergence of a Kurdish military power in northern Syria. ISIS attack on Kobani(Ayn al-Arab) failed, as well as its more recent attack on Hasakeh. Moreover, Kurdish fighters succeeded in a rapid attack on ISIS-held Tel Abyad, thus linking Kurdish areas around Kobani with other regions controlled by Kurdish fighters more to the east in Qamishli.
Here, we have a major shift in Turkish policy towards Syria and the role of jihadist militants there, an indirect confession of failure of its earlier policies.
At the same time, Turkish airplanes attacked PKK positions in the Qandilmountains north of Iraq. Following the Suruç bombing, Kurdish activists had accused Turkish state of collaboration with ISIS and attacked and killed two soldiers. This too is a change of policy since the declaration of cease-fire between Ankara and Kurdish guerrillas in January 2013.
Isn’t the Syria policy another major failure for the Erdogan administration, after his failure in the last elections? Turkish media reports that in return Turkey tacitly obtained a no-fly-zone for Syrian planes in the northern regions, something to be yet confirmed in the coming weeks.
The question remains: why did Ankara play a dangerous game with jihadist groups for so long in Syria and Iraq? We all know that all countries that tried to use them were eventually attacked by the same jihadi militants. Pakistan is a perfect example. Just like Pakistan, the Turkish authorities under Erdogan have ideological affinities with the jihadists, and in spite of a battle the break is difficult to be definitive.
Vicken Cheterian, PhD, is lecturer in international relations and media studies in Geneva. His latest book: Open Wounds, Armenians, Turks, and a Century of Genocide, Hurst, and Oxford University Press.
